Posts Tagged ‘drug cost reduction’

PBM Consulting – New AWP Benchmark

Friday, August 20th, 2010

Here we are approaching the one-year anniversary (September 26, 2010) of the effective date of the McKesson AWP settlement, and unfortunately, little has changed.  At WBC (wbcbaltimore.com) we have followed this case from the get-go, through negotiation and settlement. We have helped our clients with their direct participation in the class action settlement, as well as active involvement in evaluating their PBM.   The question remains: where’s the new pricing standard that was anticipated?

As a refresher, part of the settlement involved the publishing of AWP by First DataBank, who along with McKesson Corp., were defendants in the action.  One of the remedies was for First DataBank to cease publication of this standard within 2 years of the effective date of the settlement.  Many thought a new benchmark would be introduced in short order to replace the perceived gap in a reliable and representative alternative.  Much was written about whether WAC, AMP or ASP would fill the void.  Several PBMs altered their benchmark and have adopted WAC in their pricing proposals.  So what happens? The vast majority of PBMs simply adjusted their pricing discounts to reflect a lower AWP.  They tauted it as “cost-neutral” to the client.  What they didn’t say was the adjustment. i.e. reduction in cost,  did not save the client any money.  They did, however, remind  clients that they weren’t going to be charged more!

To further delay the wheels of change, Wolters Kluwer, the publisher of Medispan, which is the largest competitor to First DataBank’s AWP’s Blue Book, has announced that they will continue to publish AWP “until relevant industry or governmental organizations develop a viable, generally accepted alternative.”  Interestingly, Medispan was a party in the settlement and had agreed to stop publishing by September 26, 2011.  Let’s see if Judge Saris, the judge who heard the case and approved the settlement, has anything to say.

There really is no national standard that has gained traction as a suitable alternative. A committee that was commissioned by the National Council for Prescription Drug Programs recommended that WAC be used as a replacement benchmark for single-source drugs, while no recommendation was made to cover multi-source products.  In our opinion, the best bet for future guidance seems to reside with our friends at CMS. They prefer AMP, and plan to begin publishing AMP pricing in October. We believe that if and when this occurs, the rest of the industry will fall into line within a year. It is a big “if” however, since the retail pharmacy associations don’t seem to want any part of more transparent pricing, at least as it applies to their pharmacy setting. When CMS announced a recent plan to produce pricing surveys and publish results with acquisition cost pricing, they were faced with a firestorm of resistance from the pharmacy lobbies.  Litigation has been promised if CMS continues to pursue this course, so we’ll have to wait and see what happens.  It may be a harbinger of things to come related to PBM pricing benchmarks.  Stay tuned!

PBM Consulting – Top 15 Therapeutic Classes

Monday, July 26th, 2010

IMS Health data for 2009 creates an interesting picture of global drug sales and growth in specific therapeutic classes. WBC (wbcbaltimore.com) has taken a look and found that the global picture is clearly different when compared to  U.S. pharmacy benefit plan sponsor drug spend.  In the U.S., antipsychotics were the leading therapeutic class with $14.6 billion in sales. Antilipididemics (like Lipitor, Crestor, simvastatin, etc.) with $14.3 billion is number two; acid reflux (Nexium, Prevacid, etc.) with $13.6 billion in sales comes in at number three; and antidepressants (Cymbalta, Effexor, etc.) holds down the number four spot with $9.9 billion in sales. Surprisingly, oncology agents, while number one globally in sales, ranks number six in the U.S.

Here are the global sales and growth numbers for 2009:

Drug Class

2009 Sales (billions)

Annual Growth

Oncologics

$52.37

8.8%

Lipid Regulators $35.28 4.9%
Respiratory Agents $33.59 11.0%
Antidiabetics $30.40 13.4%
Anti-ulcerants $29.61 0.6%
Angiotensin II Antagonists $25.20 11.4%
Antipsychotics $23.24 4.6%
Antidepressants $19.41 -1.3%
Autoimmune Agents $17.96 18.0%
Platelet Aggr. Inhibitors $14.60 9.0%
HIV Antivirals $13.75 14.9%
Anti-epileptics $12.99 -19.8%
Narcotic analgesics $11.23 8.6%
Non-narcotic analgesics $11.17 7.3%
Erthropoietins $10.80 -4.1%

Data source: IMS Health

PBM Consulting – Financial Incentives

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

Decisions decisions! Benefit managers and prescription benefit plan sponsors face the challenging balancing act of getting more members to take their medications while controlling their health plan costs. The logic appears intuitive: the more members stay compliant with their drug regimens, the fewer emergency room visits and in-patient hospitalizations.  Studies have shown that 25% of prescriptions go unfilled and almost 50% of patients don’t take their medications as prescribed.   The problems are that (1) more drug compliance means more up-front costs via increased drug spend; and (2) trying to determine what types of incentives or penalties need to be used in order to motivate members to take their medication is a work in progress.

At WBC (wbcbaltimore.com), we have found that the most popular technique being currently utilized is benefit design, the so called “value-based” benefit design. This is where co-payments are reduced or waived for those proven medications that help regulate health status for chronic conditions such as diabetes and asthma. But is that enough? Some plan sponsors don’t think so. They are trying a new incentive: a compliance lottery!  Here’s how it works: certain drugs are identified as being lottery-eligible. A special dispensing mechanism records which patients are taking their drugs and gives them the chance of winning a lottery prize ranging from $10 to $100 each day they are compliant.  Aetna is one of  the first health plans that is exploring this approach with some pilot programs.

Will it work? We don’t know, but we have our doubts. People do love lotteries, but research has shown that the penalty approach, i.e., the fear of loss, trumps the anticipation of gain as a motivational force. Maybe a better approach is to create a fear of not winning the lottery!  Plus, the current monitoring systems might be gamed. They can monitor dispensing, but it doesn’t neccessarily mean the patient is taking the medication.  

We’ll be watching the results to see if paying members to take their meds proves to be a viable option in our ongoing efforts to improve health status and quality of life while managing costs.

PBM Consulting – Access Based Network Design

Tuesday, June 29th, 2010

Never let it be said that Walmart doesn’t know marketing. In the aftermath of the CVS/Caremark/Walgreens turf battle, where the question of adequate member access was raised (Networked),  Walmart jumps right back into the frey and releases their low-price network option.  They are referring to it as *Access Based Network Design* and are touting it as a new strategy to “create a break in the cost curve and slows future cost increases by applying downward pressure on cost.   How, one might ask?  At WBC (www.wbcbaltimore.com), we know the answer.  It’s by finding the right-sized network to fit the access needs of the payor.

Walmart bases this strategy on three tenets of pharmacy cost containment:

  1. Leverage supply and demand to create competition among pharmacy providers;
  2. Build the right-sized network from the “bottom-up” determining the number of pharmacies the payor’s population needs rather than the number of pharmacies out there; and
  3. Offer financial incentives to plan members to influence steerage and offset any disruption or inconvenience.

Sounds promising so far.  I mean, is there really any reason to offer a 60,000+ store network? In some markets, there is literally a network pharmacy on every corner.  Most plan sponsors can get along just fine with a much smaller offering, something in the 20,000 store range.  Walmart makes the case that, rather than having incentives to keep prices as high as possible without getting kicked out of the network, the Access Based Network aligns the pharmacy’s interest with the payors, competing to be included by reducing their prices.

Building a right-sized network may be easier than the plan sponsor has been led to believe and without major disruption to their members.  Medicare, for example, has established an access standard that can prove very instructive for a commercial plan sponsor.  The Medicare standard is:

Urban Access- On average, at least 90 % of Medicare beneficiaries who live in an urban area must have access to a network pharmacy within 2 miles of their home.

Suburban Access – On average, at least 90% of Medicare beneficiaries who live in a suburban area must have access to a network pharmacy within 5 miles of their home.

Rural Access- At least 70% of Medicare beneficiaries must have access to a network pharmacy within 15 miles of their home.

As mentioned above, this standard can almost always be met with  20,000 or less pharmacies!

The financial incentives to members can be the final piece that puts this type of strategic plan design in play. A reduced co-pay to offset any inconvenience of driving a few more blocks could do the trick.  Many times, it does not have to be a huge enhancement.  Walmart suggests that a $10 co-pay could be reduced to $7, for example.

WBC has been a big proponent of right-sized networks for some time and this organized effort by Walmart is an aggressive step in the right direction.   That being said, Walmart does not hold an exclusive with this type of concept.   Keep in mind they are not trying to become a PBM.  They promote their efforts as PBM-agnostic. Just about any PBM worth their salt can design and manage a selective network of this type.  We think you’ll find it’s worth discussing with your PBM.

PBM Consulting – War of the Worlds

Friday, June 11th, 2010

Round Two (or  is that Round Three)  of the CVS vs. Walgreens knockdown has gotten folks attention. Walgreens came out swinging, both fighters felt each other out, and CVS counter punched with the announcement that, rather than wait for contract renewals to have Walgreens leave the Caremark network, they will take a proactive stance and end the network participation in 30 days. (http://bit.ly/bTUZfU)

For the original story, See *PBM Consulting – Networked?* at http://www.wbcbaltimore.com/blog/

This frontpage slugging back and forth between these two heavyweights has also captured the attention of Congress. The PBM industry has long avoided federal scrutiny and oversight. Their business practices and market conduct are juicy targets for a Congress and an Administration hungry for power and control. No crisis (real or contrived) is going to go unnoticed these days.  Reps. Bruce Braley, D-Iowa, and Peter Welch, D-Vermont, have started the inquiry by sending a letter to three powerful House committee and subcommittee chairmen, calling for enhanced congressional oversight of the PBM industry and  requesting a hearing on current industry practices!

Seems like Congress may just be waking up to what approximately 30 State Attorneys General have already started, that is,  an attempt to bring some real transparency to the PBM world.  Many pharmacy benefit plan sponsors have wondered why  “traditional” PBM business practices have continued under the radar for so long.  After all, Third-Party Administrators (“TPAs”) who are paid to process medical claims on behalf of health plan sponsors, would be shuttered and their officers indicted if they ran their businesses in a fashion similar to many PBMs!

Here’s a link for more details of Congressional interest:  http://bit.ly/9iFGOl

WBC will continue to follow these developments to keep you informed regarding PBM news that may effect the operation of your plan.  Visit us at www.wbcbaltimore.com

PBM Consulting – Networked?

Tuesday, June 8th, 2010

To quote the great Peter Finch’s character Howard Beale in Network  ”….My life has value….I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore.”   I guess this may apply to anticipated potential unrest when pharmacy benefit plan sponsors go to renew their CVS/Caremark contracts and find out that Walgreens has decided to drop out of the Caremark network. While it won’t take effect for current contracts, it will apply for all new contracts and renewals.  With the announcement yesterday (http://bit.ly/cUXu80), Walgreens sent the analysts scurrying for answers.  Was this a pre-emptive strike against an arch-rival, a response to the market impact that Caremark’s Maintenance Choice (90-Day at Retail program) has had, or a little of both?  Maybe even a little competitive envy, since Walgreens PBM arm, Walgreens Health Initiatives, offers a similar 90-Day at Retail program to Caremark’s, called Advantage 90.  In any case, it was a bold announcement by Walgreens, since the Caremark business represents about 11% of their revenues!

In our opinion, this movement is the beginning of what we’ll call “Being Networked.”  It’s actually a progression of what we at WBC (www.wbcbaltimore.com) , and others have called “The Walmart Effect,”  i.e., bringing improved pricing through select networks (we like that term over “restricted”).  Being Networked then means that plan sponsors will be presented the choice of reducing the size of their PBM network in exchange for improved pricing, all while trying to balance any potential employee/member noise over the loss of retail outlets.  In the case of Walgreens and Caremark, however, the plan sponsor won’t have a choice.  Walgreens has made it for them!

A number of issues remain to be seen. Will Caremark find 1/1/11 renewals difficult to sell, without the Walgreens stores?  Will employees/members really care?  Will improved discounts off of AWP (as a result of a select network)really change the net cost of drugs to any substantial degree?  As in most areas of PBM-ology, the answer is ” It depends.”   Mostly, it depends on the geography of the plan sponsor and their employees/members. In many areas, Caremark can easily jettison Walgreens without missing a beat.  Benefit managers will hardly hear a peep from employees, simply because  CVS, Rite-Aid, Walmart, Target and the supermarkets offer more than adequate access.  The fact is, just about no plan sponsors needs the full 60,000+ store retail networks offered by most PBMs. The opposite is also true in some markets where Walgreens rule.  It should be interesting to see what happens in metro NYC with the Duane Reade chain that was purchased by Walgreens in March 2010 and remains the dominant retail outlet in that market .

The real story behind the story, however, in the opinion of WBC,  is how does a plan sponsor select a PBM to manage their pharmacy benefit?   The plan sponsors generally are looking for three things:  reduced cost, member satisfaction, and management assistance so the H.R. departments aren’t taxed with pharmacy benefit- related issues. This announcement from Walgreens may motivate plan sponsors to dig a little deeper as to what they are receiving from their PBM. We believe it should also open the discussion regarding not just meaningless superficial discounts in a spreadsheet analysis, but real  plan management for significant reduced net cost.

PBM Contracting – Big MAC is a Whopper

Wednesday, June 2nd, 2010

PBM pricing is still a mystery to most plan sponsors of pharmacy benefits. At WBC (www.wbcbaltimore.com), we’re continually seeing spreadsheet comparisons of one PBM’s versus another.  Is that AWP-58% or AWP-62%?  Which one is better?  Which one represents lower cost of the plan sponsor? On the surface, a reasonable person might surmise that -62% is a deeper discount than -58%, thereby yielding a lower net cost.  Ah, but not so fast!

The answer to which is better. i.e., which costs less is “It depends.”  It depends on what the AWP price is that’s being reduced by the discount. This is particularly true when trying to compare costs of generics.  There may be 5 or 6 or more manufacturers of the generic drug that could be filled at the pharmacy, either at retail or mail.  Here’s an example: Fluoxetine (generic Prozac) has an AWP of  between $0.72 and $3.55  per pill when compared between five manufacturers of the generic. Obviously, taking 60% off of the $3.55 option yields a higher payment from the plan sponsor than a 58% discount off a $0.72 pill. One answer to this dilemma is the creation and application of a MAC list.

MAC is the acronym for Maximum Allowable Cost (“MAC”) and serves as a reference price to establish a maximum cost that the PBM will pay for a generic drug. Each PBM applies a “secret sauce” that they usually view as a proprietary methodology to come up with their MAC list and pricing, but for simple illustrative purposes, think of it as an arithmetic mean to reach a price (i.e., five manufacturers with pricing ranging from $.72 to $3.55, add up the individual prices and divide by 5).  In the example of the Fluoxetine, the MAC price may be $2.22. This will be the maximum cost that a PBM would pay to the pharmacy.

Simple enough, and pretty straight forward if this is where the story ends. Again, not so fast!  Many PBMs confuse the solution by creating multiple MAC lists.  Each one may represent different pricing and a different number of drugs.  Some lists may only include a relatively small number of drugs (300 for example), while others can be very broad (over 2,000 drugs).   It serves the interest of the plan sponsor to receive the broadest possible MAC, since the MAC pricing represents the largest equivalent AWP discounts (some MAC pricing is equal to AWP-95% or more).  When a generic drug is not on the MAC list, it will receive a much lower discount and may be as low as the brand discounts (AWP-18% for example). Some PBMs have what are known as the “Bill MAC” and the “Pay MAC.”   This may come as a shocker to the plan sponsor, but a PBM may submit one Bill MAC to the plan for payment and turn around and use a Pay MAC to the pharmacy, which has entirely different and higher pricing. The PBM pays a lower price to the pharmacy, but bills the client and inflated cost, creating a pricing spread that makes the PBM’s shareholders very happy.

Another Big Mac attack is when the PBM only applies MAC pricing at retail, leaving mail order generics as their holy grail for PBM profit potential. For PBMs that provide a true pass-through pricing model, it doesn’t matter, because you will receive whatever the discount turns out to be.  Under traditional pricing, however, MAC pricing at mail will reduce the plan sponsors cost through that channel. The PBMs typically don’t volunteer to offer MAC at mail. The plan sponsor has to request or negotiate it as a feature in their PBM contract.

What’s the take-away to this story? First, decide if undisclosed pricing spreads are acceptable to your view of vendor relationships; second, make sure your PBM offers you a broad MAC list; and third, if you use a PBM that has your plan on a traditional pricing model, require that MAC pricing be applied at mail.